Privacy Law and Policy : Privacy Lawyer & Attorney : Kevin Whitaker Law Firm : Patient Confidentiality, Defamation, Identity Theft : Privacy Law & Policy Blog

“We heard testimony from a wide range of sources, and the message was that we have struck the right balance. We created regulations that are protective of consumers without being onerous to businesses,” Undersecretary Anthony said.

The regulations, known as 201 CMR 17 (PDF file), are designed to help preserve privacy by increasing the level of security on personal information. These regulations apply to those that own or license “personal information” about a Massachusetts resident. Personal information includes a resident’s first name and last name (or first initial and last name) in combination with their: (a) Social Security number; (b) driver's license number or state-issued identification card number; or (c) financial account number, or credit or debit card number, that would permit access to a resident’s financial account.

The regulations require businesses take a risk-based approach and develop, implement, and maintain a written comprehensive information security program containing administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the size, scope, and type of business. The written security plan takes into account the amount of resources available; the amount of stored data; and the need for security and confidentiality of both consumer and employee information. Further, the written security plan also requires a comprehensive security system be included which covers computers with access to the stored personal information (including any wireless system.)

The regulations set minimum requirements to the extent they are technologically feasible. For instance, encryption of personal information is required for: a) transmitted records and files that will travel across public networks, b) data transmitted wirelessly, and c) information stored on laptops or other portable devices. Further, the security system requirements for computers require other protocols be adopted and followed (e.g. passwords, training, restrictive and monitoring efforts, as well as firewall, malware, and other updated protections.)

In examining reported data breach incidents, OCABR found that less than 3% involved data that was encrypted when breached. In addition, they found 60% of the reported incidents were the result of criminal/unauthorized acts, with a high frequency of laptops or hard-drives being stolen, and that roughly 40% of the total incidents were the result of “employee error or sloppy internal handling of personal information or other data.”

The OCABR report adds, “[t]his confirms that any regulatory regime must include both measures that protect against intentional wrongdoing and measures that focus on establishing internal protocols that set minimum standards for handling sensitive paper and electronic records.” These concerns, and others, lie at the foundation of the adopted regulations.

In sum, the new regulations seek to balance consumer protections with business concerns. Business owners should review the regulations fully as the requirements are comprehensive and may require time and effort to comply with. In addition, there are also extended deadlines and requirements for businesses that contract with third parties. To learn more about identity theft protection, visit the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation website at www.mass.gov/consumer.

A second online conversation occurred on February 13, 2006. Zubiel brought up several intimate topics asking questions about her physical appearance and her sexual experience and requested she send him a nude photograph of herself. Zubiel also asked if she was a police officer, acknowledging that they could get in trouble for what they talked about.
 

The next day, February 14, 2006, Zubiel e-mailed Marino a photograph of himself. Again, they discussed sexual topics online and Marino told Zubiel her mother would be working that weekend and she would be home alone. Zubiel questioned Marino further on her sexual history, telling her he would like to visit and “teach [her] everything."
 

On February 15, 2006, they had an online conversation regarding Zubiel's potential visit. They also spoke on the telephone because Zubiel wanted to make sure Marino was not a police officer. Again they discussed sexual topics, and Zubiel said, "I will show you the right way."
 

The final online conversation occurred two day later on February 17, 2006. Afterwards, Marino telephoned Zubiel (upon his request) and Zubiel said he would visit her the next day. Marino gave him an apartment complex address in Marshfield. The next day, Zubiel telephoned Marino for directions as he was entering Marshfield. Zubiel arrived, began walking toward the apartment building, and was arrested.

Following his arrest, Zubiel reportedly admitted the following: his "screen name" was "Ilikesports04,” he had conducted all of the online conversation with Marino, "it was a possibility that he would have sex with this girl if -- if, indeed, she was a real girl, and that the thought was there for him to have sex with this minor." Zubiel gave the police permission to seize his computer and a forensic examination revealed searches for Marshfield High School, directions to the apartment complex, the profile page of "Melissa QT 1995," the photographs that Marino and Zubiel sent to each other, as well as portions of the online conversations.

So why did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reverse the indictments? Because online electronically transmitted conversations are not explicitly included under the law’s definitions and the court wasn’t going to update the definitions for the Legislature. Under the law, there are four broad categories of criminally disseminated matter that are covered: 1) any handwritten or printed material; 2) any visual representation; 3) any live performance; and 4) any sound recording. The Court found none of these categories applied in the present case. In sum, this case comes down to a matter of words—words the Legislature should quickly correct.
    
The Court states, “If the Legislature wishes to include instant messaging or other electronically transmitted text in the definition of "[m]atter" […], it is for the Legislature, not the court, to do so.” A footnote indicates the Legislature considered amending the law in 2000 to include computer-generated writing, but it has not acted. The court’s tone here suggests that it’s time for the Legislature to take action. At least, I hope that is the message received.

The Legislature should enact enforceable child privacy protection laws quickly. Updated laws are necessary to combat the growing threats dangerously lurking online. Our advancing Information Age, with its evolving communication mediums, requires modern laws that protect children from online sexual predators. Until then, the existing outdated and technologically silent laws only serve to invite these same predators in, and not guard against them.

See Commonwealth vs. Matt H. Zubiel, Slip Opinion, SJC Docket No.: SJC-10454

SECTION 1. Section 2 of Chapter 93H of the General 1 Laws, as appearing in the 2006 Official Edition, is hereby amended by striking out subsection (a) and inserting in place thereof the following:(a) The department of consumer affairs and business regulation may adopt regulations relative to any person or agency that owns or licenses personal information about a resident of the commonwealth. Such regulations shall be designed to safeguard the personal information of residents of the commonwealth and shall be consistent with the safeguards for protection of personal information set forth in the federal regulations by which the person or agency is regulated. The objectives of the regulations shall be to: insure the security and confidentiality of customer information in a manner fully consistent with industry standards; protect against anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such information; and protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information that may result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any consumer. The department shall not in its regulations, however, require covered persons to use a specific technology or technologies, or a specific method or methods for protecting personal information.

The regulations shall take into account the person’s size, scope and type 15 of business, the amount of resources available to such person, the amount of stored data, and the need for security and confidentiality of both consumer and employee information. Notwithstanding the rules adopted by the department pursuant to the provisions above, said department shall create separate regulations for small businesses covered by this chapter that reflect said small businesses unique situation and resources.

Any person who is required to comply with federal laws, rules, regulations, guidance, or guidelines safeguarding personal information is deemed to be in compliance with this chapter.

SECTION 2. Section 6 of Chapter 93H of the General Laws is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the following: A willful violation of this chapter or regulations implementing this chapter, or a written information security plan issued by a person covered by state or federal privacy laws shall provide just cause for the termination of an employee, whether the employee is employed by a private person, public agency or political subdivision of the state.

For more posts from this Series see:

• An Act Ensuring Less Privacy of Massachusetts Residents' Data: Part One
• An Act Ensuring Less Privacy of Massachusetts Residents' Data, Part 2 of 5
• An Act Ensuring Less Privacy of Massachusetts Residents' Data: Part 3 of 5
• An Act Ensuring Less Privacy of Massachusetts Residents' Data: Part 4 of 5,

If you are interested in tracking Senate Bill 173 or others, perhaps this resource from the University of Iowa law library may be helpful. Here are a few of the helpful offerings or resources available there.

• Massachusetts Legislative History Guide
• Guide to Tracing a Massachusetts Law
• Senate Bills (2007 - present)
• House Bills (2005 - present)
• Bill Histories (2005 - present)
• Senate Journals (1998 - present)
• House Journals (2001 - present)

Anyone who's been on Facebook, reviewed the MySpace postings' cases, or "googled" a job applicant only to be stunned by what they found would have a hard time arguing against Schneier's assessment. But sometimes it's hard to see the forest through the trees, especially when the trees have surveillance cameras and are keeping track of almost everything you are doing.

In a forum post that caught my attention as I browsed my alert feeds tonight, one poster remarked, "Think about it:

• If you drive to work and use an electronic toll pass it's recorded. All of your stops and even the speed you are going is recorded in a box within the car that can be admissible in court (i.e.; you don't own the data).
• If you use a computer at work all your emails are recorded and probably the keys you type too.
• If you're in a secure building your access is tracked and they take pictures too.
• If you shop and use either a debit, credit or loyalty card your purchases are recorded.
• Government buildings (and most commercial buildings and stores now) record your presence on cameras and may require ID before you are allowed to enter.
• If you travel by train, plane or ship your travel is recorded.
• If you buy drugs at your local pharmacy, it's recorded regardless of whether you use cash or not.
• If you buy a house, car or anything that requires financing, it's recorded.
• If you get a paycheck, bank or file a tax return it's recorded.
• If you give marry, divorce, give birth or die, it's recorded.
• If you are arrested or convicted it's recorded.
• Does it not feel a bit like "The Truman Show" already?
• Now they can aggregate all that information into one place and even produce predictability models on what your future behavior will be.
• Does it matter?
• Do you care if your [curious] employer, friends, neighbors or co-workers can pay to find out how much you make, how much you paid for your house, what your political affiliation is, if you're taking paxil or get all the gritty details of your unfortunate divorce or sexually transmitted disease?
• Do you care if your partner can track your whereabouts?
• Do you care if the government can track your whereabouts?
• Do you care if the information is accurate?
• Maybe it just does[n]'t matter?

The commenter's argument demonstrates it's easy to see protecting privacy rights is an uphill battle, but I'd argue privacy always has and continues to matter. Orwell's 1984, James Joyce in several works, today's movies such as Minority Report or Eagle Eye tap into our worse fears in abandoning privacy and giving up control over our private lives. While these works capture the mind and our attention when examining them, they don't, by themselves, move privacy into the realm of policy, law, and legal protections. This is one reason why I think a Privacy Law and Policy Blog matters, too (and why I've associated both law and policy in this blog's title.) This conversation about privacy isn't new one, however, but it's a conversation which needs to be occurring some place, especially given the speed and economic incentives that today favor weakening individual's privacy protections.

Schneier's environmental analogy is a good one. While the environmental fight is hardly over or been won, it's an example of a movement that has taken years of efforts by many to raise its level of awareness and to work its way into moral, policy, and legal discussions.  While not comparing the two on any substantive level, privacy rights, like environmental rights, seems to have difficult forces working against it today much like the environmentalists have faced for years.  At times it was obvious to see the frustration in Al Gore's efforts to bring the environment front and center, even on cases that just made sense. Privacy rights seem to be facing similar opposition and a misalignment with common sense.

For instance, do we really need laws that allow schools to prevent a parent from being contacted and then allow a school nurse and administrator to strip search a 13 year old honor roll student to see if she has any Ibuprofen in her bra or underwear? This is a recent case before the Supreme Court. During oral arguments on this case, some members of the Supreme Court seemed to dismiss this girl's notion of privacy right's altogether. If this is the state of affairs today, what's going to happen when social network sites, sexting, data breaches, international phishing, and other matters continue to arise. The courts aren't keeping pace with technology or with the way a younger society is living.  In some ways it's ironic that an institution shrouded in privacy misses the public's interest in privacy. Recently in MA, a federal district court judge was told she can't allow a RIA hearing to be streamed live over the internet. The judge wanted to stream the hearing live, but was appealed and told "no."

Technology and the law are not strangers and, again, this debate isn't new, but the blistering pace and extent of changes in today's social communications seems far greater than those occurring before these times--but perhaps the principles being fought for aren't all that new. 

On December 15, 1880 Warren and Brandeis published, The Right to Privacy, in the Harvard Law Review, and wrote

Of the desirability -- indeed of the necessity -- of some such [privacy] protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those who may be the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. In this, as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand. Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in the lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence.

...

  It would doubtless be desirable that the privacy of the individual should receive the added protection of the criminal law, but for this, legislation would be required. Perhaps it would be deemed proper to bring the criminal liability for such publication within narrower limits; but that the community has an interest in preventing such invasions of privacy, sufficiently strong to justify the introduction of such a remedy, cannot be doubted. Still, the protection of society must come mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual. Each man is responsible for his own acts and omissions only. If he condones what he reprobates, with a weapon at hand equal to his defence, he is responsible for the results. If he resists, public opinion will rally to his support. Has he then such a weapon? It is believed that the common law provides him with one, forged in the slow fire of the centuries, and to-day fitly tempered to his hand. The common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to his own officers engaged in the execution of its command. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?

I'll end this post (which started off with the intent of being short) with a short Benjamin Franklin quote,

They who would give up an essential liberty for temporary security, deserve neither liberty nor security.

Joel Ruiz, the plaintiff, filed a complaint for negligence and other theories under California law because Ruiz was one of approximately 750,000 Gap job applicants whose personal information was stored on laptops owned by Vangent (a Gap vendor) which were stolen. In this lost-data case, the court found Ruiz had standing because of his increased risk of identity theft (due to the stolen personal data.) Winning the standing argument, however, proved to be an empty victory as the court found the threat of speculative harm was not enough to proceed under a cause of action for negligence.

While Ruiz has standing to sue based on his increased risk of future identity theft, this risk does not rise to the level of appreciable harm necessary to assert a negligence claim under California law.

While not binding on the court, the court surveyed several similar rulings that it found both persuasive and consistent with its decision:

• [O]nline applicant whose personal information was compromised had standing to sue ... [but] this compromise of the applicant's personal information did not rise to the level of a compensable injury and damages required ... under Indiana law.
• Without more than allegations of increased risk of future identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm that the law is prepared to remedy.
• [N]o evidence that this plaintiff's data has been accessed or used by anyone as a result of the theft.
• [M]ere possibility that personal information may be at increased risk does not constitute actual injury sufficient to maintain a claim for negligence.
• [W]ithout direct evidence that the information was accessed or specific evidence of identity fraud this Court can not find the cost of obtaining . . . credit monitoring to amount to damages in a negligence claim.
• [E]xpenditure of time and money monitoring their credit did not establish the essential element of damages.
• [P]laintiff could not sustain a claim for negligence because he had experienced no instance of identity theft.

Is stolen property not valuable until it's shown someone else is using it to the owner's detriment? Or is it a real loss simply when it's taken, regardless of what the thief does with it? I don't agree that your privacy rights only matter when someone uses it to your proven detriment, to me, one's privacy rights are harmed when someone invades it and takes it, regardless of what they do with it. As long as convenience and commerce trump privacy, however, then privacy is unlikely to be taken seriously by the companies it's entrusted to.

While today much discussion and focus is being placed on notification and encryption legislation (and even these seem to be in retreat), at the end of the day, unless people have rights and laws with some real teeth, privacy will become a topic that gets into papers and perhaps gets you into court, but it's not likely to become a seriously protected or respected right. That is, unless real recovery and damages are allowed under privacy torts. While the government may find ways to collect fees or revenue for large-scale privacy transgressions, the public remains at a collective loss. As our modern travels have taken us from ships at sea and into the "cloud" of computing and data, must the Titanic of privacy rights sink before we protect against foreseeable harm?  The NY Times article of 1912 referenced above stated the following which has an element of timelessness to it,

...there was no pretense of carrying enough lifeboats to save the lives of all if a vessel should go down. The only reason given for this lack of facilities is that the law does not demand it,...

Before Weaver, two New York trial courts had heard similar cases with each reaching different conclusions on GPS usage and privacy rights:

• No requirement to obtain a search warrant before attaching a GPS device to track the movements of a vehicle on public roadway.  vs.
• In the absence of exigent circumstances, the attachment of a tracking device on the undercarriage of a vehicle is an intrusion requiring a search warrant.

The Weaver case, however, was a case of first impression at the appellate division court and ultimately at the New York State Court of Appeals. In Weaver, the lower appellate division court (now reversed) found a GPS posed no 4th amendment issues based on:

• There is no expectation of privacy as to the location of a vehicle on public streets;
• There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the publicly accessible exterior of one's vehicle;
• The undercarriage is part of a vehicle's exterior;
• Collecting information about the movement of a vehicle on public thoroughfares by means of an electronic device attached to a vehicle's undercarriage, which does not damage the vehicle or invade its interior, does not constitute a search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment

Additionally, the reversed appellate division court noted that since visual surveillance could have gleamed the same information, there was no problem in allowing a GPS to accomplish the same.

The New York State Court of Appeal's, however, in a 4-3 ruling reversed the order of the Appellate Division.  Thus, Weaver's motion to supress the evidence obtained from the GPS device was granted and a new trial was ordered. Sewell Chan's New York Times article, Court Strikes Down GPS Tracking Without Warrant covers the recent ruling.

I think the close decision is a sign of the times and that it reflects the uncertainties surrounding technology and protected privacy rights.  In fact, the 4-3 split decision was delivered in three written opinions and the majority did not base its decision under privacy protections afforded under federal law, but instead, on those grounded in state law.

The majority's opinion compared the types of technology involved in Weaver (and its constant invasiveness) versus more limited surveillance technologies used in the past.  I predict this is likely to be a continued theme as more and more cases continue to test the limits of technolgy and privacy's protections.

These prescient questions are not limited to any one jurisdiction. The Weaver majority reviewed other states' laws for guidance on GPS technology:

We find persuasive the conclusions of other state courts that have addressed this issue and have held that the warrantless use of a tracking device is inconsistent with the protections guaranteed by their State Constitutions

While narrowly asserting privacy rights in NY, the majority's opinion expressly leaves open questions of federal law.

In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that the determinative issue remains open as a matter of federal constitutional law, since the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon whether the use of GPS by the state for the purpose of criminal investigation constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, and, indeed, the issue has not yet been addressed by the vast majority of the Federal Circuit Courts.

I anticipte these federal questions will likely be pressed in time. As for now, in NY and by the slimmest of margins, the majority's opinion held:

1. There was a search under the New York State Constitution (by using the GPS device); and


2. The search was illegal because it was executed without a warrant and without justification under any exception to the warrant requirement.

Perhaps technology mustn't trump privacy rights after all...

The officers unsuccessfully argued, in part, the search of the in-laws' property was constitutional because it was authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. In a 2-1 split, the majority disagreed and found because these Fourth Amendment principles were clearly established, the intrusions were unreasonable. Further, the majority held the officers are not entitled to raise qualified immunity as a defense to the in-laws' civil suit against them. Justice O'Brien, dissenting, stated,

Regrettably, I can find comfort in no part of the majority opinion.

In support of the officers actions, O'Brien argues,

[a] law trained judge found the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause and issued the warrant....
...
Qualified immunity seeks to...[shield] officers from damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions so long as their actions are objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of their actions....That standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments," protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."

The majority dismissed the dissent's arguments and found the officers could be liable in a § 1983 claim because they had a duty to exercise professional judgment objectively and despite any approval by a judge,

employ[ing] a reasonable process in seeking the warrant" does not relieve officers of their constitutional duty to "exercise their own professional judgment" as to the existence of probable cause.

SUMMARY

U.S. District Appeals Court for the District of New Mexico finds:

1. "A familial relationship to someone suspected of criminal activity, without more, does not constitute probable cause to search or arrest."


2. Officers failing to heed this interpretation may be subject to civil liability under a § 1983 lawsuit without the protection of a "qualified immunity" defense.

There are some basic questions the court will need to address. Do MA inmates have a reasonable expectation of privacy in jailhouse phone conversations? What about those who are presumed innocent, but incarcerated while awaiting trial? There are a number of arguments for safety and other reasons that generally support monitoring of inmates calls. See here for some examples. Prosecutors have had access to these recordings for some time. One MA jail administrator testified to receiving about 150 subpoenas for recordings per month. This case also asks, however, should prosecutors first be required to seek a judge's approval to obtain copies of recorded conversations? Or, should jails provide copies of these tapes to prosecutors whenever they receive a subpoena from the D.A.'s office?

The Boston Herald reports in, Court to consider John Odgren’s recorded jail calls,

For more than a decade, inmate phone conversations in Massachusetts have been recorded, and prosecutors have routinely subpoenaed the recordings to use as potential evidence at trial.

But in the Odgren case, Judge Raymond Brassard said that under Massachusetts rules of criminal procedure, prosecutors should have obtained the court’s approval before issuing subpoenas for the recordings. ...

Prosecutors argue Odgren had no "expectation of privacy" because he was well aware of the policy on recording conversations, which is stated in a prerecorded message at the beginning of each call. Odgren also signed a document that informed him that all phone calls and conversations were recorded and monitored. ...

But defense attorneys say the rules of criminal procedure require prosecutors to first convince a judge that the tapes are relevant and admissible as evidence.

Colin Miller, at  The Evidence Prof Blog,  in a  Nov, 2007 post discussed this issue in a case outside of MA where the defendants argued taping the defendant's call violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Miller states,

The problem with this argument, however, is that for Fourth Amendment rights to apply, inter alia, the speaker must have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and most courts have found that no such reasonable expectation exists in outbound calls from prison. See, e.g., United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996). The prosecutor in the Glover case successfully argued this point and noted that inmates and the people they call are warned each time they speak over a jail telephone line that the authorities are taping the conversation.

While not controlling, previously, this "consent" argument appears in MA, too. In the Norfolk County Superior Court case of Commonwealth v. Deryck Long and Paul Brown a footnote indicates,

Inmates are informed that their calls to those outside the jail are subject to monitoring, so there is no claim that these conversations were improperly intercepted.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons' website records calls and states:

A notice is posted next to each telephone advising inmates that calls are monitored. Unmonitored calls to attorneys are permitted in certain circumstances. Third-party or other alternative call arrangements are not permitted; this ensures inmates do not have the opportunity to use phones for criminal or other inappropriate purposes.

Thus, it seems the practice of monitoring conversations will likely continue to be allowed as prohibitions against this would be a distinct departure from current practices. The question of how prosecutors gain access to these recordings, however, seems to be a trickier question for the court to consider. Further is there a difference between someone already convicted versus someone awaiting trial? Will factors other than one's rights be considered? Given the cuts in budgets, are the administrative costs, time, and resources of additional court proceedings warranted? Especially when various notices indicate the calls are being recorded? I'd bet allowing prosecutors to obtain these recordings through subpoenas will continue, or if court permission is first required, then these requests will most likely be granted routinely.

I assume an argument will likely be made that defense attorneys can seek to have materials ruled inadmissible after disclosure but before trial. I suspect this argument will win the day, but this is only my guess. Nonetheless, prosecutors and defense lawyers across MA will be watching this case closely to see what privacy rights, if any, a jailed person has to their phone conversations and what procedures will be required in future prosecutions.

Other news' posts covering this case include:

• Mass. high court to consider recorded jail calls
• Judge says Odgren's jailhouse conversations cannot be used in L-S slay case
• State presses for Odgren jailhouse tapes
• Use of taped conversations barred in student's trial: Jailhouse talks with kin at issue
• Defense: Teen Insane When Classmate Stabbed; Prosecutors Say Phone Conversations Show Lucid Boy